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RESEARCH NOTES

DOES POLITICAL
INCORPORATION MATTER?
The Impact of Minority
Mayors over Time
JOHN P. PELISSERO
Loyola University Chicago

DAVID B. HOLIAN
Indiana University

LAURA A. TOMAKA
Council of State Governments

The authors assess the effects of minority political incorporation in large cities. An interrupted
time-series research design is used to determine whether the election of a city's first minority
mayor has any short -term or long-term impact on fiscal policies. The authors examined six cities
that elected black or Latino mayors and six cities with white mayors from 1972 to 1992. In general, they find that minority political incorporation did not significantly change fiscal policies in
different ways from that which occurred in cities without minority incorporation.

As minority mayors have assumed power in America's cities, scholarly
research has attempted to determine if this level of political incorporation
(Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984) increases the level of responsiveness to
the needs of minority citizens. Such responsiveness may take the form of
greater expenditures for minority communities, alterations in city revenue
and spending policies, and changes in other public policies that benefit
minority groups. Many mayors are severely constrained in their ability to
alter city spending and revenue patterns by economic circumstances and
mandates placed on them by federal and state authorities-regardless of their
racial or ethnic background (Peterson 1981). Many minority mayors have
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had the misfortune of assuming power when these constraints were intensified by mounting economic pressures and dwindling intergovernmental
assistance, particularly from federal sources (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb
1997; Keller 1978). Hence, the likelihood of significant change in city policy
following the election of a minority mayor may be quite limited.
In this article, we assess the impact of minority mayors more systematically than past research by applying a quasi-experimental pooled time-series
research design to the question of whether a minority mayor who succeeds a
white mayor has any short-term or long-term impact on city revenue and
expenditure patterns. We examine six cities that elected black or Latino mayors and six comparison cities with white mayors between 1972 and 1992. Our
purpose is to answer the following question: Does political incorporation
matter over time?

POLITICAL INCORPORATION

The minority political incorporation model of Browning, Marshall, and
Tabb (1984) has served as a theoretical benchmark for research on minority
politics for more than a decade. The model holds that for a minority community to witness an effective response to its needs, minority leaders must come
to occupy positions of governmental authority. By extension, the election of
minorities to the offices of city council member or mayor should result in
greater responsiveness to minority public policy concerns (see also
Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1997).
Studies addressing potential policy changes following elections of minority mayors suggested that new black or Latino leaders were expected to meet
the standards (both real and imagined) of their white predecessors and to
assume office and improve the living standards of even their poorest constituents, in spite of severe institutional and economic constraints (Preston 1976;
Bullock 1975; Nelson 1972). Recent research on difficulties facing minority
mayors who attempted to assemble an effective governing coalition supports
these findings (Reed 1986; Bennett 1993). Empirical studies of the subject,
however, have found little difference in levels of fiscal policies by white and
black mayors (Keller 1978; Nelson 1978). In contrast, Karnig and Welch
(1980) provided evidence showing that over time, the presence of a black
mayor led to significantly greater welfare expenditures; lower spending on
city services such as parks, libraries, and fire protection; and more federal aid.
The latest research on mayoral change in cities over time (Wolman, Strate,
and Melchior 1996) has looked at policy change following a change in mayoral administration. Using a time-series design, the authors compared cities
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that changed mayors to a "control" group of cities that kept incumbents in
office from 1974 to 1985. They found that changing mayors led to differences
in expenditure policies when compared to cities that maintained incumbents.
However, this study did not examine minority mayors replacing whites and
the policy changes following this political transition.

RESEARCH DESIGN
Karnig and Welch (1980) looked at potential policy consequences of
black mayoral leadership over time. Their study is instructive, but it analyzed
a period (1968-1975) in which black public officials were only beginning to
make inroads'into mayors' offices throughout the country. Wolman, Strate,
and Melchior (1996) examined mayoral change over time but did not focus
on change to minority leadership in cities. Our research combines both
approaches by presenting a portrait of six large minority-led cities and their
fiscal policies over time and compares these to similarly situated cities governed by white mayors during the same period. Both the effects of change and
racial change can be examined in such a model.
Following Campbell and Stanley (1966), a quasi-experimental
time-series design is employed to test for potential policy effects of the ascension of minority mayors to power in six major U.S. cities. These cities elected
minority mayors to succeed white administrations in the 1970s and 1980s,
and they serve as the experimental cases in this analysis. Thus, the election of
a minority mayor functions as the interruption (X) in the following timeseries design:

For the sake of comparison, six cities that consistently had white mayors
were selected as matches. The following criteria guided the matching of cities: (1) all cities are mayor-council in form,l (2) popUlations of paired cities
are roughly comparable,2 and (3) whenever possible, experimental cities are
paired with cities in the same state to ensure uniformity in functional responsibilities. However, where in-state matching is not feasible, cities are paired
by regional proximity, and responsibilities for funding education and public
welfare services are the same as their experimental match.
The six pairs of cities included in the analysis are reported in Table 1 along
with the year in which a new minority mayor came to power. Spending and
revenue trends are compared using the new mayor's second year in power as
3
the intervention. Comparisons between groups of cities are made on three
fiscal dependent variables reported annually in U.S. Bureau of the Census

RESEARCH NOTES

87

sources: 4 general revenue per capita, intergovernmental revenue per capita,
and general expenditures per capita. 5
Modeling past research (Morgan and Pelissero 1980; Meier 1980), three
independent variables are included in the analysis to detect the impact, if any,
of the newly elected minority mayor: first, a counter, coded 1,2,3, ... n, to
assess any overall trend in the annual values of the dependent variables
(yearly trend); second, a term for the slope, coded 0 before the interruption
and 1 thereafter, to measure any short-term or immediate effect of the new
mayor; and third, a term for the postinterruption change in slope, coded 0
before the intervention and 1,2, 3, ... n thereafter, to measure any long-term
policy impact of the new minority mayor.
The method used in this analysis is feasible generalized least squares
(FGLS), appropriate for cases in which observations are pooled across time
and space. 6 FGLS accounts for serial correlation common to time-series
applications and heteroscedasticity across panels common to cross-sectional
analysis. Furthermore, because our cross-sectional units are not randomly
selected households but cities with arbitrarily drawn boundaries, we do not
expect the panels to be mutually independent. Rather, we allow for correlation between the error terms of the separate panels (Kmenta 1997, 622).7 A
separate pooled analysis is performed for the experimental cities and the
comparison cities (i.e., those cities electing a minority mayor to succeed a
white mayor and those cities electing white mayors throughout the time
period). For each case (city), the same 21-yeartime period is analyzed: 1972
through 1992. We assume that cities experienced similar forces as their match,
such as the same changes in intergovernmental relations or federal aid.
Table 1 displays the name of the first minority mayor selected in each city,
along with their year of assuming office. The results for each group are compared for differences in the effect of mayoral change on the independent fiscal measures. The intervention is measured one year following the election
year because new mayors must work with their predecessors' budgets in their
first year in office. The intervention year for an experimental city is the same
one used for its matched comparison city.
Our expectation, based on previous research, is that the election of a
minority mayor will not have a significant effect on fiscal policies over time.

FINDINGS
The analysis begins with an examination of the effects of mayoral change
on general revenues over time. Table 2 shows that among the experimental
cities-those that elected a minority candidate to succeed a white mayor-
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TABLE 1:

Experimental and Comparison Cities

Experimental Cities
Chicago
Philadelphia
Baltimore
New Orleans
Denver
Birmingham

Mayor

Elected/Appointed

Comparison Cities

H. Washington
W. Goode
C. Burns
E. Morial
F.Pena
R. Arrington

1983
1983
b
1986
1977
1983
1979

Milwaukee
Pittsburgh'
Boston
Baton Rouge
AlbuquerqueC
d
Montgomery

a. Richard S. Caliguiri became interim mayor of Pittsburgh in April 1977, then won election to
that post in the following November.
b. Clarence H. Burns became mayor by virtue of succession when William Donald Schaefer left
the office to become governor of Maryland. Kurt L. Schmoke then defeated Burns in the Democratic primary ana became mayor of Baltimore in November 1987.
c. Harry Kinney was elected to his second nonconsecutive term as mayor in November 1981. He
first served as mayor from 1974 to 1977.
d. Emory Folmar became mayor after winning a special election to replace James Robinson,
who resigned the mayoralty. Folmar was reelected in 1979.

the yearly trend in general revenue per capita was positive and significant.
Likewise, the yearly trend in comparison cities with white mayoral administrations was that of significant growth but less than the rate in minority-led
cities. Per capita general revenues increased $57 each year in cities electing a
new minority mayor, as opposed to $37 in comparison cities. This trend
appears to be unrelated to the election of a minority mayor because the
matched cities had a similar, significant growth in revenue. The election of a
new minority mayor demonstrated no significant short-term or long-term
effects on general revenues. Each model was significant and demonstrated
that there were no differences between the two groups of cities on changes in
general revenue policy.
The effects of mayoral change on per capita intergovernmental revenues
are also shown in Table 2. The results were similar to those for general revenues. The yearly trend in intergovernmental revenue per capita was positive
and significant for both the experimental and comparison groups. Cities
electing minority mayors added $18 in intergovernmental revenue per capita,
whereas cities with white mayors over the time period added $20. Mayoral
change demonstrated no significant short-term effects on intergovernmental
revenue. The long-term effect of mayoral change was negative and significant in experimental cities, with a decrease of $12.50 per capita. But a similar
long-term effect was shown in the comparison cities, with a $13.40 decrease.
Both models were significant and show that there were no statistically significant differences in intergovernmental revenue per capita between cities that
elected minority mayors and those that did not.
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Effects of Change in Mayors on City Government Finances,
1972-1992 (n = 126)

General Revenue
Per Capita
Independent
Variables

Experimental

Comparison

Intergovernmental
Revenue
Per Capita
Experimental

Comparison

Time (counter)
57.35*** 36.62***
18.24*** 20.01 ***
5.78
3.83
3.49
2.95
SE
-29.64
-24.19
-6.15
-4.22
Short term
19.17
16.85
12.70
14.94
SE
12.75
-0.15
-12.49** -13.39**
Longterm
8.97
5.88
5.10
4.58
SE
Intercept
264.37*** 220.24*** 54.47
50.37*
80.20
47.62
36.64
23.10
SE
-599.19
Log likelihood -619.05 -611.47
-559.56
Wald chi
232.79*** 245.07*** 35.94*** 77.76***

.

*p ~ .05. **p

~

General
Expenditures
Per Capita
Experimental

Comparison

53.11 *** 39.11***
8.21
5.82
-52.77
26.98
29.23
31.24
-5.09
16.19
12.68
10.04
266.82** 149.69**
87.20
49.19
-673.59
-724.89
138.85*** 141.48***

.01. ***p ~ .001.

The final column in Table 2 shows the effect of mayoral change on general
expenditures per capita. For both groups of cities-those changing to minority administrations and those maintaining white administrations-the yearly
trend in general expenditures per capita showed positive and significantly
higher spending. Expenditures per capita increased by $53 in experimental
cities and by $39 in the matched group of cities. Neither the short-term nor
the long-term effects on spending were significant in either group of cities.
Both models of expenditures were significant and showed that minority-led
cities' spending patterns were not statistically different from spending in
similar cities over the same time period.
We analyzed several functional areas of city spending too. Our pooled
time-series analysis of per capita spending on police, fire, parks and recreation, and housing and community development did not reveal any statistically significant differences in minority-led cities.

DISCUSSION
After nearly 30 years of witnessing minority candidates succeeding white
mayors in big cities, the following question has lingered: What differences in
fiscal policy result from the election of a minority mayor? Does minority
political incorporation really matter in fiscal policy areas? Having
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successfully established a winning electoral coalition, do minority mayors
act differently in policy making than their white counterparts?
We have examined these questions over time in 12 cities-6 cities electing
blacks or Latinos as mayor and a comparable group of 6 cities that did not
change to minority administrations. We studied the short-term and long-term
effects of mayoral change and did so across two sets of fiscal policy areas,
revenues and expenditures. From these findings, we may conclude that electoral change that produces minority political incorporation may not dramatically change policies. Revenue policies per capita do not seem to be altered
following minority incorporation.
Wolman, Strate, and Melchior (1996) found that changing mayors in
mayor council cities led to higher real per capita spending. What our findings
suggest is that changing to a minority mayor may not produce similar growth.
Minority mayors may develop an effective governing coalition or urban
regime after some time in office that gives them the leverage needed to redirect some key spending areas. But it appears that newly elected minority
mayors, unlike their white counterparts who are either incumbents or newly
elected, may still face obstacles that prevent them from having a significant
impact on the city budget (Bennett 1993).
This research suggests that there are limitations to the normative expectations of fiscal policy changes with minority political incorporation. Significant changes in city revenues and spending per capita were not apparent in
our 2l-year study. The actual policy impacts of political incorporation over
time may be much more modest than proponents would expect.

NOTES
I. One of the comparison cities, Montgomery, was a commission government that changed
to mayor council in 1979.
2. The greatest disparity in population exists in the Chicago-Milwaukee match. Chicago's
population outstrips Milwaukee's by more than 2 million persons over the course of this analysis. Similarly, Philadelphia consistently has over 1 million more inhabitants than Pittsburgh. The
popUlation difference between the rest of the pairs averages about 250,000.
3. The interruption is lagged one year under the assumption that any mayor's policy impact
will not be felt in his or her first year when operating under the outgoing administration's budget.
4. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, City Government Finances (various years).
5. City population changes between census years were evenly distributed across the years
(e.g., a population gain of 100,000 between 1970 and 1980 would result in an increase of 10,000
to a city population in each year from 1971 to 1980).
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6. Specifically, we use the "xtg1s" command in Stata 6.0.
7. Following Beck and Katz (1995), we also estimated the models in this analysis using
panel-corrected standard errors. However, regardless of method-feasible generalized least
squares (FGLS) or ordinary least squares with panel-corrected standard errors-our substantive
conclusions do not change. Thus, we report only the FGLS estimates.
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